Smart sanctions are an increasingly popular tool for banning rogue actors from the global economy. In this paper, by analyzing the smart sanctions lists issued by major institutions worldwide, we identify the hierarchical influence structure among these institutions that encourages them to take such actions. By performing a Helmholtz-Hodge decomposition of the influence network among the institutions, as constructed from the smart sanctions lists they have issued, we show that meaningful insights about the hierarchical influence structure behind smart sanctions can be obtained.
Introduction
As globalization progresses, economic trade among nations has been growing at an increasing rate. There is no doubt that this global expansion of economic trade contributes to the growing prosperity for the global economy, but the rising geographical and cultural distance among the participants makes it challenging to avoid trading with entities (e.g., companies and individuals) that are involved with illegal criminal activities such as money laundering, terrorism, drug cartels, and human trafficking. To tackle such challenges, governments and international organizations around the world are increasingly interested in issuing smart sanctions lists, which contain the names of entities involved in such criminal acts.
However, these lists vary quite substantially, both in the set of entities being banned and the timing of their inclusion, even when the target category is the same. By analyzing the similarities and differences among such lists, we can shed some light on the influence network that governs the institutions issuing such lists. For instance, some institutions might be vigorous in collecting intelligence that influences others to follow, whereas other lists might be ignored because of a different understanding of the problem. Some authoritative institutions might have a higher standard of banning an entity, while others might take actions without much undeniable evidence. It is also possible that an institution is merely copying the entities added to another, prestigious list to project a sense of international cooperation, without actively collecting intelligence themselves [1] . Thus, understanding the influence network of smart sanctions might shed some light on the global political structure governing the banning of rogue actors from the international economy.
In this paper, we describe the application of network analysis to the influence network that governs the major institutions issuing smart sanctions lists. We use a dataset that includes over 1,700 smart sanctions lists, mainly focused on banning global criminal activities, and perform a Helmholtz-Hodge decomposition on the network constructed from this dataset. We show that this simple analysis readily provides meaningful results, opening the door to a better understanding of the global political process behind smart sanctions lists.
Data
We use the smart sanctions list data included in the Dow and Jones Adverse Media entity, State-owned companies, and the Watchlist datasets. The Dow and Jones datasets contain approximately 1,700 smart sanctions lists from 2001 to the present. There are a total of 85 institutions (e.g., countries and international organizations) that have issued sanctions lists. The top five institutions, in terms of the total number of sanctions lists issued, are the EU, the United States, Japan, Canada, and the United Nations.
Each entry in a sanctions list consists of the name of the entity sanctioned and the date of their inclusion. The influence network analyzed in this paper is constructed from this dataset as follows. We first treat each institution that has issued a list as a node. For each pair of institutions, if institution B included the same entity on their list at a later time than institution A, we add a weight (i.e., 1) to the edges between A and B. A pair of institutions have no edges if there are no common entities on the lists that they have issued. We ignored cases when two institutions added an entity on precisely the same date, and the direction of influence was not clear. This procedure produces a weighted directed network of institutions, as shown in Fig. 1a . The network can be decomposed into two communities, distinguished with two colors, by standard modularity maximization techniques.
Helmholtz-Hodge Decomposition
The flow F ij running from node i to node j in a directed network can be decomposed into
where F p ij denotes the gradient flow and F c ij denotes the circular flow. The circular flow (i.e., F c ij ) corresponds to the feedback loops that are inherent in such networks. The gradient flow (i.e., F p ij ) can be understood as the hierarchical component of the network, where information flows from nodes with higher potentials to nodes with lower ones. Mathematically, this can be written as j and φ i denotes the Helmholtz-Hodge potential associated with node i. The Helmholtz-Hodge potential of a node reflects its hierarchical position in its flow structure, neglecting the effect coming from the feedback mechanism. The potential φ i for every node can be easily determined by minimizing the overall squared difference between the actual flow and the gradient flow (see [2] for more details). Figure 1b shows a summary of the results 4 . We can see that the OECD and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), which are primarily focused on specific issues, top the list, showing that they are less influenced by the sanctions lists issued by other institutions. Among the G7 countries (i.e., Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States), Japan scores the lowest. This is to be expected, because Japan is relatively inactive when it comes to gathering information outside of Japan, and merely follows lists created by international organizations [1] . The fact that the UN Security Council and EU are quite low on the list is also notable, as these two organizations require a higher standard of banning compared to lists issued at a country level. To summarize, our analysis provides meaningful insights into the hierarchical influences underlying smart sanctions lists.
Results

Conclusion
In this paper, we showed that by analyzing the similarities and differences among smart sanctions lists, we could shed some light on the influence network that governs the institutions issuing such lists. This opens the door to a better understanding of the global political process behind smart sanctions lists.
